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Introduction
The likelihood that the
next human influenza
pandemic virus will
emerge from the bird
influenza virus circulating in Eurasia
remains unknown.

Pandemics occur when
human populations are
exposed to highly
transmissible disease
organisms to which they
have little or no
immunity.

The likelihood that the next human influenza pandemic virus will emerge from
the Asian strain of the H5N1 high pathogenic bird influenza virus that is causing
widespread outbreaks in Eurasia remains unknown. (See Glossary for italicized terms.)
Because these bird influenza outbreaks remain primarily an animal disease, there is hope
that a human pandemic can be prevented. Eradication of the H5N1 high pathogenic bird
influenza virus needs to occur at the farm level in the countries where it is currently
circulating. Funding of prevention, surveillance, and eradication efforts in the countries
where outbreaks are occurring or in at-risk countries will provide tools needed to
facilitate the eradication process of this virus where it is detected and will prevent further
spread and subsequent economic loss. Most importantly, stopping the spread of this virus
will decrease the opportunity for the virus to emerge as the next human pandemic
influenza virus. Every new poultry infection, and subsequent human exposure, gives the
virus an opportunity to adapt directly to humans or to exchange genetic material with
other influenza viruses, including human influenza subtypes; either event increases the
chances that the bird influenza will become a significant human disease.

Pandemics
A pandemic is an occurrence of a disease in excess of its anticipated frequency
that is geographically widespread (perhaps globally). Essentially, a pandemic is an
epidemic with a much broader geographic distribution. Pandemics occur when human
populations are exposed to highly transmissible disease organisms to which they have
little or no immunity. This exposure can result in infections, which result in disease. The
organism then escapes the infected human and is transmitted to the next susceptible
human. Because the human population is immunologically naïve, every person exposed
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to the organism is potentially susceptible and may become infected. This process can
result in rapid spread of the disease within a population and subsequent spread to distant
populations. Pandemics generally spread worldwide within 1 to 3 years. As long as
susceptible humans continue to come into contact with the infectious organism, the
disease continues to spread. This cycle stops only when large portions of the population
become immune to the infection and are no longer shedding the organism in large
numbers. Immunity occurs when people become infected, recover from the disease, and
have circulating antibodies to protect them from future disease.

Influenza A Viruses
Influenza A viruses
have caused several
pandemics in humans
throughout history.

Influenza A viruses
change, or drift,
frequently.

Influenza viruses are identified by proteins that are unique to their virus “type”
and “subtype.” The type designation comes from two internal proteins, known as the
nucleoprotein and matrix proteins and includes the type A, B, and C influenza viruses.
Type A influenza viruses are the most common, and infections have been reported in
mammals such as swine, horses, cats, dogs, marine mammals, mink, and humans, as well
as in birds. Influenza A viruses have caused several pandemics in humans throughout
history; type B and C influenza viruses also commonly cause human disease, but disease
outbreaks generally are limited in size. Influenza A viruses are characterized further
according to the antigenic characteristics of two surface proteins known as hemagglutinin
(H) and neuraminidase (N), resulting in a subtype designation. There are 16 H subtypes
and 9 N subtypes currently identified, resulting in 144 different possible combinations of
H and N subtypes among the influenza A viruses. The unique segmented structure of the
genetic material in influenza A viruses makes them inherently unstable and subject to
genetic change (Swayne and Halvorson 2003).
Humans are commonly infected with H1, H2, and H3 subtypes of influenza A
viruses. Viruses of the H5 and H7 subtype are of the most concern to agriculture because
some strains have historically caused severe disease in poultry. Because most influenza
A viruses are relatively host specific, human influenza viruses generally do not infect
birds and bird viruses generally do not infect humans. Certain influenza A viruses,
however, have exhibited an unusual ability to infect more than one host species. When
influenza A viruses from two host species co-infect the same animal, the viruses have the
opportunity to exchange genetic material that codes for the internal and surface proteins,
a process known as antigenic shift. This exchange could result in an emerging virus with
a new or expanded host range. As a result, the new virus could infect host species that
have never been susceptible before and also could cause a change in the ability of the
virus to cause severe illness (Perdue and Swayne 2005). This type of change in a virus
capable of spreading among humans could produce a pandemic.
Although some pathogenic organisms remain unchanged for many years and can
be controlled with vaccines that protect the recipient for a lifetime, influenza A vaccines
do not fit into this category. The influenza A viruses accumulate point mutations
resulting in sequential minor changes in the dominant circulating strains. This process is
known as antigenic drift. Therefore, the influenza vaccine is evaluated yearly and
changed frequently to protect against new and emerging strains of influenza A viruses.
This is why people in high-risk groups are encouraged to be vaccinated with updated
influenza A vaccines every year.
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The subtle changes seen from year to year in influenza viruses generally do not
lead to widespread severe disease, but they do make it unfeasible to stockpile large
quantities of vaccine for periods longer than 1 to 2 years. Subtle changes in influenza
viruses can render vaccines less effective with time. Sudden major changes can render
vaccines totally ineffective.

Historical Pandemics
1918–19 Spanish flu
[A (H1N1)]
1957–58 Asian flu
[A (H2N2)]
1968–69 Hong Kong flu
[A (H3N2)]

Avian influenza viruses
are carried by healthy
ducks, geese, and
shorebirds.

Highly pathogenic
avian influenza viruses
are considered to be
foreign animal diseases
in the United States.

There were three influenza A pandemics in the twentieth century. The influenza
pandemic of 1918 was the deadliest. This pandemic may have began in the United States
as an epidemic that was confined largely to military bases and prisons. Public health
officials were not overly concerned with the disease because infections tend to spread
rapidly among people living in crowded conditions. When American troops took the
virus to Europe during World War I, it quickly became established in Europe and spread
to Russia, North Africa, India, China, Japan, the Philippines, Brazil, and New Zealand.
American troops returning home brought the virus back to the United States and it spread
into the civilian population. Almost 700,000 people died from influenza in the United
States alone, and 20 to 50 million people died worldwide. Two additional influenza A
pandemics have occurred since 1918: the “Asian flu” that resulted in one to two million
deaths in 1957–58, and the “Hong Kong flu” that resulted in approximately one million
deaths in 1968–69 (Carver 2005). Each pandemic introduced a new subtype of influenza
A virus into the human population. Because people had no immunity to the new
subtypes, infection rates were very high, resulting in the spread of the viruses around the
world within 1 year of detection. All three pandemics were traced to viruses that
originated in birds and could be considered to be zoonotic diseases, that is, diseases that
originate as an animal disease, but also are capable of causing disease in humans.

Avian Influenza
All known subtypes of influenza A viruses have been recovered from birds living
in an aquatic environment, and these birds are considered to be the natural reservoir.
Avian influenza (AI) viruses are carried asymptomatically by ducks, geese, and
shorebirds; they typically do not exhibit any signs of disease. These bird species are the
perfect disseminators of influenza A viruses worldwide because they migrate for long
distances, spreading viruses through contaminated feces.
Pathogenicity is a measure of the degree of illness that AI viruses cause in
chickens. By the current definition from the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) in
France, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses cause death in at least six of
eight experimentally infected chickens. In addition, if the genetic sequence of the AI
virus in question is similar to that observed for other HPAI strains, then the virus must be
considered to be highly pathogenic, whether or not it causes overt disease. All other AI
viruses are considered to be of low pathogenicity (LPAI) (Swayne and Halvorson 2003).
This definition of the ability of these viruses to make chickens sick does not apply to
humans or human infections with AI viruses. The HPAI viruses are considered to be
foreign animal diseases (FADs) in the United States, meaning that they do not normally
occur here and they are required to be reported to the state veterinarian’s office and to the
U.S. Department of Agriculture–Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA–
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APHIS) immediately after detection. To date, all recorded HPAI viruses have been of the
H5 or H7 subtypes. The LPAI viruses are endemic to the United States, exist in wild
waterfowl and live-bird market reservoirs, and occasionally infect commercial poultry
flocks. The LPAI viruses of the H5 and H7 subtypes also are reportable to state
authorities because of their historical ability to mutate to the highly pathogenic form.
High pathogenic AI infections cause severe economic losses to affected poultry
producers and are, therefore, considered an emergency disease requiring immediate
eradication efforts.
Surveillance systems
currently are in place in
the United States that
focus on detecting AI
viruses in poultry.

Surveillance systems currently are in place in the United States that focus on
detecting AI viruses in poultry. Detection and rapid response are key elements of the
U.S. AI control program. The National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP), a program of
USDA–APHIS in cooperation with the poultry industry, monitors breeder birds (parents)
of commercial egg-type chickens, meat-type chickens, and meat-type turkeys for the
presence of antibody to AI viruses. The NPIP currently is establishing a monitoring
program for table egg chickens, meat-type chickens, and meat-type turkeys. The NPIP
program tested 390,000 AI samples from commercial poultry in 2003 to assure the U.S.
poultry industry and their trading partners that poultry products in the United States are
free of AI. In addition, many state diagnostic laboratories routinely test backyard and
commercial birds presented with respiratory disease signs for the presence of AI. For
example, the state of North Carolina tested almost 200,000 birds in 2004 and Georgia
tested 100,000 birds in 2003. The USDA–APHIS is developing an AI monitoring
program for the live-bird market system in the northeastern United States.
This early detection must be complemented with rapid and complete containment
plans. Avian influenza outbreaks involving low pathogenic strains of the H5 and H7
subtype generally are handled at the state level. Plans to eradicate H5 and H7 strains in
poultry flocks have been developed in most poultry-producing states. These plans are
widely disseminated and are activated immediately upon detection of one of these strains.
These procedures allow poultry producers to protect their investments by quickly
eradicating an influenza virus before it becomes highly pathogenic.

The farming practices
and culinary customs
unique to Asia are
believed to be
associated with the
transmission of AI
viruses from birds to
humans.

Human Cases of Avian Influenza
In recent years, there were fewer than 100 reported human deaths worldwide
associated with AI. Most of these deaths were attributed to the Asian HPAI (H5N1) virus
that is circulating in parts of (Eurasian) Asia. Most human deaths attributed to Asian
HPAI (H5N1) have occurred in Asian countries (Sims et al. 2005). It seems that the
virus has spread beyond Asia as migratory waterfowl move to winter nesting grounds or
through the movement of infected domestic fowl, but only a small number of human
cases have been reported outside of Asia. The farming practices and culinary customs
unique to Asia are believed to be associated with the transmission of AI viruses from
birds to humans. In most of the human cases of Asian HPAI (H5N1), there was close
contact with infected live or recently dead birds. There have been no human cases of
Asian HPAI (H5N1) associated with eating properly cooked poultry meat or eggs. The
Asian HPAI (H5N1) virus strain infecting humans can cause severe disease and death
partly because humans have little to no immunity to the H5 subtype viruses. There have
been fewer than 200 documented human cases of Asian HPAI (H5N1) resulting in fewer
than 100 deaths during an 8-year period despite the probable exposure of millions of
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transmission of Asian
HPAI (H5N1) has been
limited.

Asian HPAI (H5N1)
remains primarily an
animal disease. It is not
easily transmitted from
birds to humans.

Introduction of Asian
HPAI (H5N1) to the
United States could
occur via infected birds
or infected humans.
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people in these countries, making the transmission of the virus from birds to humans rare.
Human-to-human transmission of Asian HPAI (H5N1) has been limited and sustained
human-to-human transmission has not been documented; however, each additional
human case increases the chance that the virus eventually will improve its transmissibility
in humans. The emergence of an Asian HPAI (H5N1) virus strain that is transmitted
readily among humans could result in the start of a new pandemic.

Pandemic Risk Assessment
Asian HPAI (H5N1) remains primarily an animal disease. It is not easily
transmitted from birds to humans and human-to-human transmission has not been shown
to be sustained. The relatively few confirmed human deaths that have occurred
worldwide reflect how rare this virus infection is in humans. During the 8-year period
cited previously, approximately 288,000 Americans died from human influenza.
Currently, the risk of humans contracting Asian HPAI (H5N1) is extremely low.
The spread of Asian HPAI (H5N1) to poultry in additional countries is likely
during waterfowl migration, through trade in the live-bird markets, and through the
movement of infected domestic fowl, especially ducks. Heightened surveillance for
waterfowl die-offs and outbreaks in poultry flocks is needed to quickly identify virus
spread and to initiate response programs. Because the Asian HPAI (H5N1) virus is
highly pathogenic in most poultry species and some wild birds, disease detection should
not be difficult in most cases, provided adequate diagnostic capability is available.
Domestic ducks, however, have been shown to be asymptomatic carriers of the virus and
may serve as a silent reservoir for the disease. Heightened efforts to detect influenza
viruses in asymptomatic birds are important to ensure early detection and eradication.
Rapid depopulation and destruction of infected flocks followed by thorough cleaning and
disinfection are essential in ensuring that Asian HPAI (H5N1) remains an animal disease
and is eventually eradicated altogether. Intensified testing of flocks in close proximity to
known positive flocks could prevent asymptomatic flocks from moving to processing or
to other markets. Unfortunately, many at-risk countries in Eurasia, the Middle East, and
Africa lack the necessary diagnostic and animal health infrastructure to adequately carry
out surveillance for the presence of Asian HPAI (H5N1) and will require significant
financial help from the more developed countries.
Introduction of Asian HPAI (H5N1) to the United States could occur via infected
birds or infected humans. Because the United States does not import live birds or poultry
products from countries where the Asian HPAI (H5N1) has been reported, the most likely
bird source for Asian HPAI (H5N1) would be migratory waterfowl or illegally smuggled
birds. Birds migrating into and out of the Asian HPAI (H5N1) endemic areas are not
likely to be an issue in the United States until spring migration and the return of birds to
summer nesting grounds. The eastern-most flyways for migratory birds in Asia do
include the Arctic and Alaska, although no positive birds have been detected there to
date. Increased surveillance along these flyways could facilitate early detection if Asian
HPAI (H5N1) were to be introduced. No major poultry-producing regions exist in the
Arctic or in Alaska, but the west coast of Canada and of the United States (Washington,
Oregon, and California) are potentially at risk.
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Heightened human surveillance for signs of severe respiratory disease should be
implemented, especially for those people traveling to or from endemic areas or those
living there. Reporting of human cases of respiratory diseases and more intensive testing
for influenza A viruses could provide early detection in the unlikely event that human
infections occur.
Birds grown in modern
confinement housing
are at a much lower risk
of contracting AI from
wild birds than are birds
raised outside.
The spread of Asian
HPAI (H5N1) in Asia
occurs mostly in small
villages where poultry
are raised in open fields
with exposure to wild
migratory birds and
then sold live in village
markets.

Different farming systems are associated with the differing risks of both bird
infection and human infection. Birds grown in modern enclosed housing are at a much
lower risk of contracting AI from wild birds than are birds raised outside. Modern U.S.
farm production practices provide for more control over the movement of poultry and
allow for the implementation of strict biosecurity procedures designed to prevent the
introduction of disease agents to domestic flocks. In addition, commercial poultry raised
in integrated agricultural systems typically are grown on farms dedicated to a specific
processing plant and are not sold or commingled in livestock markets. Effective
surveillance systems and veterinary oversight help decrease the risk of spreading AI
viruses in commercial poultry in this country. This modern type of poultry production is
more protective of birds and their health than traditional agricultural systems in which
birds are raised in small flocks outside, a system that is commonly found in countries in
the developing world. The spread of Asian HPAI (H5N1) in Southeast Asia is mostly
occurring in small villages where poultry, especially domestic ducks, are raised in open
air fields with exposure to wild migratory birds and then sold live in village markets
(Sims et al. 2005). This practice promotes the maintenance of the virus reservoir in
domestic ducks and leads to recurring infections.

Conclusions

Education of U.S.
citizens about the
relatively low risk of
becoming infected with
Asian HPAI (H5N1)
virus is needed.

The Asian HPAI (H5N1) remains primarily an animal agriculture disease today.
Eradication of this disease needs to occur at the farm level in the countries where it is
currently circulating. Adequate federal funding of prevention, surveillance, and
eradication efforts in Asia and in the at-risk countries outside of Asia not only will
facilitate the eradication process if this virus is detected but also will prevent further
spread and subsequent economic loss to the affected country and decrease the opportunity
for the virus to adapt to humans. Every new poultry infection, and subsequent human
exposure, gives this virus an opportunity to exchange genetic material with other
influenza viruses, including human influenza subtypes, and increases the chances that
Asian HPAI (H5N1) will become a significant human disease. Education of U.S. citizens
about the relatively low risk of becoming infected with Asian HPAI (H5N1) virus is
needed to calm the fears of a pandemic created by the almost constant media publicity on
this issue.

GLOSSARY
Antigenic. Having the properties of a substance that induces a specific immune response; usually resulting in the
production of antibodies that prevent future disease from specific organisms.
Antigenic drift. Small, gradual changes in the genetic make-up of the virus resulting from errors in copying the genetic
material.
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Antigenic shift. Wholesale changes in the genetic make-up of the virus resulting from the exchange of gene segments
between different viruses.
Asymptomatic. Without clinical signs or symptoms.
Endemic. The usual presence of a disease or infection.
Epidemic. An occurrence of disease in excess of its anticipated frequency.
Pandemic. A geographically widespread epidemic usually spreading worldwide in 1 to 3 years.
Pathogenic. Having the ability to produce disease.
Zoonotic. Having the ability to infect both animals and humans.
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